戦争と宗教　「強さとは　生きるために殺すこと」なり 橋下徹はなぜ戦争を目指すのか 「アークが産んだ、正義は悪魔」

エレウシス密儀のイニシェーションとオルフェウス教の秘儀は後代の作者たちによって称揚されて、
グノーシス思想の神話化とギリシャ・オリエントの重層信仰（シンクレティズム）を反映しているのである。

しかし、エレウシス密儀とオルフェウス教のこのような概念こそが、
中世の錬金術やイタリアのルネッサンス、
１８世紀の「オカルト信仰」の伝統、さらにロマン主義に影響を与えたものであり、

またリルケからＴ・Ｓ・エリオットや、ピエール・エマヌエルにいたる近代ヨーロッパの詩人たちに霊感を与えたのが、アレクサンドリアの学者、神秘家、神学者たちのエレウシス密儀であり、
オルフェウス教なのである。
ー中略ー

この強さと豊かさという言葉は、そのもっとも強烈な、劇的な意味で理解されなければならない。
なぜなら、人間は「時の始めに」なされた決定、
すなわち、生きるために殺すという決定の最終的所産であるからである。
ー中略ー

食用植物は、神の身体から生じたのであるから神聖である。
食事をすることによって、人間はつまり神を食べているのである。
食用植物は動物のように、世界の内に「与えられている」のではない。
それは原初の劇的事件の結果であり、
この場合は、殺害の生み出した物である。

ミルチア・エリアーデ「世界宗教史１」ちくま学芸文庫より引用

エレウーシスの密儀では、密儀参入者は「麦の穂」を手渡された、
なぜ麦の穂であったのか。

世界各地の神話では、食物は死んだ神の体から生じたとされている。

たとえば、ギリシャ神話を見てみると、
ゼウスという最高神の下に、
ヘラを始めとする女神が描かれている。

ゼウスはこの世の初めから世界を支配していたのではなく、
クレタ島に生まれた後、戦い（戦争）を経てギリシャと世界の最高神となってゆく。

ゼウスに従った女神たちの多くは、
その土地でゼウスなどより、はるかに前から信仰されてきた女神たちであった。

しかし、ゼウスとの戦争に負けた古ギリシャ民族は、
殺され、大地の堆肥となる。
ここに「豊穣の女神の儀式」の原型を見ることができる。


つまり、密儀が示す「豊かさ＝穀物」とは、
他国を侵略して得る果実、収穫を意味している。



日本もまた、第二次世界大戦前は東洋のゼウスとなったが、
敗北して一転、女神とされた。

ヘラら女神たちはゼウスに従わない場合、厳しい罰を受けている。
日本も同じだ。
アメリカという現代のゼウスに従わなければ、
厳しい罰を受けることだろう。
ゼウスの背後にはクロノスが控えているが・・

ビーナス、つまりアフロディーテの神話、
またはデメーテル・コレーの神話を見ればよく分るように、
日本にように去勢された女神は、
時々さらわれ、冥界へと連れ去られる。

それは、他国によって侵略され、
征服されるということを意味している。


こうした神話＝思想が、世界を動かしているエリートたち、
つまりグノーシス主義者たちによって、
深く信仰され、秘匿され、

たとえばフリーメイソンという組織として姿を現している。


ユダヤ人支配層らがなぜ格別に豊かなのかは、
躊躇せず、他民族を殺し、奪うことができるからである。

豊かさとは、富の収奪であって、
大規模に収奪するためには、
徹底的に殺すしかない。

なぜブッシュが強引にアフガニスタンやイラクを戦争で破壊したのか、
これらの国民は生活すらままならず、
アメリカら欧米資本に豊かな資源を奪われているというのに、
なんら抵抗もできないでいる。

こうして去勢された女神が生贄となり、
ユダヤ人を始めとする欧米資本家たちが、

世界中の一般庶民の富を９９％集めても届かないという、
「富の集積」を実行し、
王侯貴族以上の暮らしを送っているのだ。


神話はその事実を説明するものでるあが、
庶民は神話の意味を理解していない。
（そういう私も、若い頃は何も知らなかった）

時々引用しているが、
聖書においてもカインがアベルを殺した後、
農民から王へとなってゆく。


このように豊かさとは、原初に起きた殺人を再現し、
つまり戦争によって大々的に他人を殺すことによって得られるものであり、

ユダヤ教、キリスト教、イスラム教、
そしてギリシャ神話など、
世界の大衆を支配している大宗教が、

こうした「死と再生の秘儀」を奥義として受け継いでいる。


そのために、世界から戦争がなくなることがないのである。

人間の精神＝心を支配して、
宗教は戦争を引き起こす。

それは、この世界で起きている戦争が証明している。

いかにこれらの宗教が「戦争反対」と言ったところで、
その奥義の中身がこれであるから、
それは口先だけの言葉となる。

よって、宗教が戦争を止揚することはなかった。
逆に宗教によって戦争が引き起こされてきたのだ。


それが、世界の不思議として、
大衆が戦争の原因を正しく理解できない壁となって聳えている。

私はその壁を小さな槌でコツコツと叩いている。
ダムに生じる、蟻の穴を目指して。


強さとは生きるために殺すことである。


その現実を世界でもっとも良く理解しているのがユダヤ人なのである。
なぜなら、聖書によって、「殺せ、奪え」と幼い頃から叩き込まれるからである。
「鉄は熱いうちに叩け」
幼児の頃に、ユダヤ人は「強さとは何か」を叩き込まれる。
まさにプラトンが言う哲学教育である。
（いま、日本で橋下徹が教育界を支配しようとしているのもそのためだ）

そして世界から奪うのである。
この世界を支配するために。
タイタンの血が、聖書がタルムードが、カバラがユダヤ人をそうさせるのだ。


であるのに、世界最大の悲劇の民と思わされているところに、
「世界の大悲劇」がある。


彼らこそ世界各地で民を滅亡させてきたというのに、
アメリカ大陸とその島々がもっとも良い例ではないか。

その楽園に住んでいたネイティブ・アメリカンはほとんど殺され、
ユダヤ人が新しい支配者、
ギリシャ神話で言うゼウスとして君臨しているというのに。

誰かが豊かになるため、
また破綻寸前の国家を再生させるために、
日本にも戦争が求められている。


そのために橋下徹や石原慎太郎が国政を奪いに来る。
それを助けるのは、日本のテレビ局と新聞である。
戦争は起こるべくして起こる。

橋下独裁政権が誕生したら
電子投票が導入されるだろう。

そして橋下徹がどのような悪政を行っても、
ヒトラーにように誰も抵抗することができなくなる。


橋下に抵抗し、彼に独裁権を与えないためには今戦うしかない。

だが、私の小さな声など、
マスコミが軽く吹き飛ばしてしまうだろう。
マスコミは戦争を作るための道具である。


それは第二次世界大戦前も、第一次世界大戦前も、日露戦争前も、日清戦争前も、
そしてアフガン戦争においても、イラク戦争においても、
さらにこれから起こるであろう日朝戦争や日中戦争
または日韓戦争、新たな日露戦争においても変わりはない。


マスコミは必ずこれらの国々との敵対関係を煽り、
右翼的な指導者を国民に選択させ、
国民を戦争へと向かわせるであろう。


それが戦争というシステムを科学（アーク）にまで引き上げた、
ユダヤ人による、世界を変える術なのである。

ーアークが産んだ、正義は「悪魔」−

その最近の代表例として先日も少し書いたが、
ジョージ・ブッシュはアメリカ大統領になる前のテキサス州知事時代に、
「私はアメリカを変える」という本を出版した。

そのジョージ・ブッシュが始めた戦争が今でも継続され、
２１世紀は「戦争の世紀」となって始まった。

黄金のミレニアムと言われていたが、
その真実は戦争のことであった。

あの金正日でさえ、
「クリントンの時代は良かった」と嘆いたくらいである。

そしてわが橋下大阪市長はまるでブッシュのように「私は日本を変える」と言っている。
橋下徹は日本の諸悪の根源が「すべて憲法９条のせいだと思っています」とも言っている。


ブッシュがアメリカを変えると言って戦争を追い求めたように、
橋下徹も日本を変えると言って戦争を追い求めるだろう。

平和憲法９条を廃止してー

橋下が奏でる「軍艦マーチ」が近づいている。


そして戦争が終わり、生き残った日本のマスコミ関係者がいつの日か言うであろう。
「あのとき、橋下徹に期待したが、まさか戦争を起こすとは思わなかった。
私たちは間違っていた、橋下の巧みな言葉に大衆が騙されたように、我々も騙されてしまった。
ヒトラーの危険性に誰もが気づかなかったように、橋下徹の危険性に気づかなかったのだ」と。

私がここまで橋下の真実を書いているのに、
マスコミは知らなかったと言うでしょう。

そして「あの時は間違っていた」で済まされ、
ふたたび国民を騙す作業に取り掛かるでしょう。

子供たちが喜ぶアニメを作り、
大人たちにはスポーツ番組やドラマで現実逃避させ、
テレビ漬けにしておいて、
ふたたび人口が増えたら、
ヒトラーやブッシュ、橋下徹のような政治家を宣伝して送り出すでしょう。

悠香の「お茶石鹸」をメーカーとともに大宣伝してがっぽりと儲けながら、
なんの謝罪もせず、「私たちには何も悪くありません。悪いのは悠香です」と、
涼しい顔をしているテレビ局。

やれ悠香が悪い、いや厚生省と消費者庁にも責任があるなどとマスコミは言っているが、
確かに役所にも責任があるが、
それ以上に悠香の悪事の片棒を担いだのは、
お前たちテレビ局じゃないのか。

こうしてマスコミは悪に「善の皮」を被せて世に送り出す。

それは山口組と力道山、そして日本テレビのタッグが組まれたテレビ局の原初の時から、
なんら変わっていない。

テレビ局は悪をヒーロー（英雄）とするために生まれたのだ。

その代表がブッシュの戦争であり、
橋下徹の戦争となるであろう。


それでも大衆はテレビ局の言うことを間に受け、
戦争へと突き進む。


※今日は週一回の休みで数多くの記事を書いたので非常に疲れました。
でも、書いておいて良かったです。
いつも書けるとは限らないし、いつ書けなくなるとも限らないからです。

私は何度も同じテーマを取り上げていますが、
それは人間が（私を含めて）忘れやすいことを知っているからであり、
また、私のテーマは、
この世界から戦争をなくすことだからです。

きっと私が弱い人間であるからでしょう。
彼らと違って。


今後も宗教という視点から「戦争の真実」を追いかけて行きたいと思います、
時間の許す限り。
いつかこの世界から戦争がなくなる日がやってくることを信じて。

人類が滅亡しなければ戦争がなくなることはないなんて、
愚か過ぎるではありませんか。

強い人間が戦争を求めなくなる時代の到来を、
私は夢見ています。

真に正しい指導者が選ばれる時代の到来をー

“Fukushima Melt Through: TEPCO’s Darkest Secret”

TEPCO’s Darkest Secret

By DAVID McNEILL and JAKE ADELSTEIN

It is one of the mysteries of Japan’s ongoing nuclear crisis: How much damage did the March 11 earthquake do to the Fukushima Daiichi reactors before the tsunami hit?  The stakes are high: If the quake structurally compromised the plant and the safety of its nuclear fuel, then every other similar reactor in Japan will have to be reviewed and possibly shut down.  With virtually all of Japan’s 54 reactors either offline (35) or scheduled for shutdown by next April, the issue of structural safety looms over the decision to restart every one in the months and years after.

The key question for operator Tokyo Electric Power Co (TEPCO) and its regulators to answer is this: How much damage was inflicted on the Daiichi plant before the first tsunami reached the plant roughly 40 minutes after the earthquake?  TEPCO and the Japanese government are hardly reliable adjudicators in this controversy. “There has been no meltdown,” top government spokesman Edano Yukio famously repeated in the days after March 11.  “It was an unforeseeable disaster,” Tepco’s then President Shimizu Masataka improbably said later.  As we now know, meltdown was already occurring even as Edano spoke.  And far from being unforeseeable, the disaster had been repeatedly forewarned.

Throughout the months of lies and misinformation, one story has stuck: “The earthquake knocked out the plant’s electric power, halting cooling to its six reactors.  The tsunami – a unique, one-off event – then washed out theplant’s back-up generators, shutting down all cooling and starting the chain of events that would cause the world’s first triple meltdown.  That line has now become gospel at TEPCO. “We had no idea that a tsunami was coming,” said Murata Yasuki, head of public relations for the now ruined facility.  “It came completely out of the blue”(nemimi ni mizu datta).  Safety checks have since focused heavily on future damage from tsunamis.But what if recirculation pipes and cooling pipes burst, snapped, leaked, and broke completely after the earthquake — before the tidal wave reached the facilities and before the electricity went out? This would surprise few people familiar with the nearly 40-year-old reactor one, the grandfather of the nuclear reactors still operating in Japan.

Problems with the fractured, deteriorating, poorly repaired pipes and the cooling system had been pointed out for years. In 2002, whistleblower allegations that TEPCO had deliberately falsified safety records came to light and the company was forced to shut down all of its reactors and inspect them, including the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant.  Sugaoka Kei, a General Electric on-site inspector first notified Japan’s nuclear watchdog, Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) in June of 2000.  The government of Japan took two years to address the problem, then colluded in covering it up — and gave the name of the whistleblower to TEPCO.

In September 2002, TEPCO admitted covering up data about cracks in critical circulation pipes in addition to previously revealed falsifications. In their analysis of the cover-up, The Citizen’s Nuclear Information Center writes:

“The records that were covered up had to do with cracks in parts of the reactor known as recirculation pipes.  These pipes are there to siphon off heat from the reactor. If these pipes were to fracture, it would result in a serious accident in which coolant leaks out. From the perspective of safety, these are highly important pieces of equipment. Cracks were found in the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, reactor one, reactor two, reactor three, reactor four, reactor five.”

The cracks in the pipes were not due to earthquake damage; they came from the simple wear and tear of long-term usage.  On March 2, 2011, nine days before the meltdown, the Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) warned TEPCO of its failure to inspect critical pieces of plant equipment, including the recirculation pumps. TEPCO was ordered to make the inspections, perform repairs if needed and report to NISA on June 2nd. It does not appear that the report has been filed as of this time.

The problems were not only with the piping. Gas tanks at the site also exploded after the earthquake. The outside of the reactor building suffered structural damage. There was no one really qualified to assess the radioactive leakage because, as NISA admits, after the accident all the on-site inspectors fled.  And the quake and tsunami broke most of the monitoring equipment so there was little information available on radiation afterwards.

The authors have spoken to several workers at the plant. Each recites the same story: Serious damage to piping and at least one of the reactors before the tsunami hit. All have requested anonymity because they are still working at or connected with the stricken plant.  Worker A, a 27-year-old maintenance engineer who was at the Fukushima complex on March 11, recalls hissing, leaking pipes.

“I personally saw pipes that had come apart and I assume that there were many more that had been broken throughout the plant.  There’s no doubt that the earthquake did a lot of damage inside the plant. There were definitely leaking pipes, but we don’t know which pipes – that has to be investigated. I also saw that part of the wall of the turbine building for reactor one had come away.  That crack might have affected the reactor.”

The walls of the reactor are quite fragile, he notes.

“If the walls are too rigid, they can crack under the slightest pressure from inside so they have to be breakable because if the pressure is kept inside and there is a buildup of pressure, it can damage the equipment inside the walls. So it needs to be allowed to escape.  It’s designed to give during a crisis, if not it could be worse – that might be shocking to others, but to us it’s common sense.”

WORKER B, a technician in his late thirties who was also on site at the time of the earthquake recalls what happened.

“It felt like the earthquake hit in two waves, the first impact was so intense you could see the building shaping, the pipes buckling, and within minutes, I saw pipes bursting. Some fell off the wall. Others snapped. I’m pretty sure that some of the oxygen tanks stored on site had exploded but I didn’t see for myself.  Someone yelled that we all needed to evacuate. I was severely alarmed because as I was leaving I was told, and I could see, that several pipes had cracked open, including what I believe were cold water supply pipes. That would mean that coolant couldn’t get to the reactor core. If you can’t get sufficient coolant to the core, it melts down. You don’t have to be a nuclear scientist to figure that out.”

As he was heading to his car, he could see that the walls of the reactor one building itself had already started to collapse. “There were holes in them. In the first few minutes, no one was thinking about a tsunami. We were thinking about survival.”

Worker C was coming into work late when the earthquake hit.

“I was in a building nearby when the earthquake shook. After the second shockwave hit, I heard a loud explosion. I looked out the window and I could see white smoke coming from reactor one. I thought to myself, ‘this is the end.’”

When the worker got to the office five to fifteen minutes later the supervisor immediately ordered everyone to evacuate, explaining, “there’s been an explosion of some gas tanks in reactor one, probably the oxygen tanks. In addition to this there has been some structural damage, pipes have burst, meltdown is possible. Please take shelter immediately.” (It should be noted that several explosions occurred at Daiichi even after the March 11th earthquake, one of which TEPCO stated, “was probably due to a gas tank left behind in the debris”.)

As the employees prepared to leave, the tsunami warning came. Many of them fled to the top floor of a building near the site and waited to be rescued.

The suspicion that the quake caused severe damage to the reactors is strengthened by reports that radiation leaked from the plant minutes later.  Bloomberg has reported that a radiation alarm went off at the plant before the tsunami hit on March 11.  The news agency says that one of the few monitoring posts left working, on the perimeter of the plant “about 1.5 kilometers (1 mile) from the No. 1 reactor went off at 3:29 p.m., minutes before the station was overwhelmed by the tsunami.”

The reason for official reluctance to admit that the earthquake did direct structural damage to reactor one is obvious.   Onda Katsunobu, author ofTEPCO: The Dark Empire who sounded the alarm about the firm in his book (2007) explains it this way:

“If TEPCO and the government of Japan admit an earthquake can do direct damage to the reactor, this raises suspicions about the safety of every reactor they run. They are using a number of antiquated reactors that have the same systemic problems, the same wear and tear on the piping.”

Kikuchi Yoichi, a former GE engineer who helped build the Fukushima nuclear power plant says unequivocally that, “the earthquake caused the meltdown not the tsunami.”  In his recent book Why I’m Against the Nuclear Plants I Helped Build), he explains that poorly maintained water pipes and circulation system failure were the cause of the triple meltdown. Kikuchi in his book writes (p. 51)

 “At Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, at first the plan was to use the water coffin approach. In other words, to fill the containment vessels with water and cool down the pressure vessel and ensure a safe and stable state. However, once (TEPCO) understood that the containment vessels  had been damaged, they gave up this plan. Because water was probably leaking all over the place from the pipes, from the start this was an unreasonable scenario.”

Tanaka Mitsuhiko, a former nuclear power plant designer and science writer asserts that at least the Number One reactor melted down as a result of the earthquake damage.  He describes it as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

“The data that TEPCO has made public shows a huge loss of coolant within the first few hours of the earthquake. It can’t be accounted for by the loss of electrical power. There was already so much damage to the cooling system that a meltdown was inevitable long before the tsunami arrived.”

He says the released data shows that at 14:52 on March 11, before the tsunami had arrived, the emergency circulation equipment of both the A and B systems automatically started up. “This only happens when there is a loss of coolant.”  Between 15:04 and 15:11 the water sprayer inside the containment vessel was turned on. Tanaka says that it is an emergency measure only done when other cooling systems have failed.

By the time the tsunami arrived and knocked out all the electrical systems, circa 15:37, the plant was already on its way to melting down.

Tanaka believes that a fault in the Mark I reactor, the same type as the number one reactor, was another contributing factor to the meltdown. On November 5, 1987, NISA began an evaluation of the Mark 1 reactors to consider how much stress they could take before a LOCA would occur. The results of that evaluation have not been made public.

There are currently ten remaining Mark type reactors in Japan, according to Tanaka’s research. He believes that each one is the equivalent of a ticking time bomb.

Sugaoka Kei, who conducted on-sight inspections at the Fukushima plant, was the man who first blew the whistle on TEPCO’s data tampering with critical machinery. He says that he wasn’t surprised that a meltdown took place after the earthquake. He sent the Japanese government a letter dated June 28, 2000 warning them of the problems there. It took the Japanese government almost two years to act on that warning.

Sugaoka asserts in his letter that TEPCO left in place and continued to operate a severely damaged steam dryer in the plant even ten years after he pointed out the problem. The steam dryer had never been properly installed and was 180 degrees out of place. Sugaoka states, “It wasn’t a surprise that a nuclear accident happened there. I always thought it was just a matter of time. This is one of those times in my life when I’m not happy I was right.”

Worker A says there were “probably pieces of equipment on site that had never been checked.”

“Let’s say you have a refrigerator – the manufacturer recommends it be checked every ten years.  But it’s surrounded by many other kinds of equipment in the plant, all with different requirements for checking.  So if the refrigerator check is missed, it will be another 10 years before it is done.  Sometimes checks might not happen for decades.  In a strong earthquake, that equipment could fail.  That’s TEPCO’s responsibility. They’re supposed to make the schedule.”

Onda Katsunobu says,

“I’ve spent decades researching TEPCO and its nuclear power plants and what I’ve found, and what government reports confirm, is that the nuclear reactors are only as strong as their weakest links, and those links are the pipes.”

During his research, Onda spoke with several engineers who worked at the TEPCO plants. One told him that often piping would not match up the way it should according to the blueprints. In that case, the only solution was to use heavy machinery to pull the pipes close enough together to weld them shut. Inspection of piping was often cursory and the backs of the pipes, which were hard to reach, were often ignored.  Since the inspections themselves were generally cursory and done by visual checks, it was easy to ignore them. Repair jobs were rushed; no one wanted to be exposed to nuclear radiation longer than necessary.

Onda adds, “When I first visited the Fukushima Power Plant it was a web of pipes. Pipes on the wall, on the ceiling, on the ground. You’d have to walk over them, duck under them—sometimes you’d bump your head on them. It was like a maze of pipes inside.”

It’s not very difficult to explain what happened at reactor one and perhaps the other reactors as well, Onda believes.

“The pipes, which regulate the heat of the reactor and carry coolant are the veins and arteries of a nuclear power plant; the core is the heart. If the pipes burst, vital components don’t reach the heart and thus you have a heart attack, in nuclear terms: meltdown. In simpler terms, you can’t cool a reactor core if the pipes carrying the coolant and regulating the heat rupture—it doesn’t get to the core.”

Hasuike Touru, a TEPCO employee from 1977 until 2009 and former general safety manager of the Fukushima plant, also says:

“The emergency plans for a nuclear disaster at the Fukushima plant had no mention of using sea-water to cool the core. To pump seawater into the core is to destroy the reactor. The only reason you’d do that is that no other water or coolant was available.”

Before dawn on the 12th, the water levels at the reactor began to plummet and the radiation began rising. Meltdown was taking place. The TEPCO Press release on March 12 just after 4 a.m. states: “The pressure within the containment vessel is high but stable.” There was one note buried in the release that many people missed. “The emergency water circulation system was cooling the steam within the core; it has ceased to function.”

According to the daily Chunichi Shinbun and other sources, a few hours after the earthquake, extremely high levels of radiation were recorded within the reactor one building. The level of contamination was so high that a single day exposed to it would be fatal. The water levels of the reactor were already sinking. 6 hours and 20 minutes after the earthquake on March 11th at 9:08 the radiation level was 0.8 mSv every ten seconds. In other words, if you spent 20 minutes exposed to those radiation levels you would exceed the five-year limit for a nuclear reactor worker in Japan.

At 9:51 pm, under CEO orders, the inside of the reactor building was declared a no-entry zone.  Around 11 pm, radiation levels for the inside of the turbine building, which was next door to the reactor reached levels of 0.5 to 1.2 mSv per hour.

The meltdown was already underway.

Oddly enough, while TEPCO later insisted that the cause of the meltdown was the tsunami knocking out emergency power systems, at the 7:47 pm TEPCO press conference the same day, the spokesman, in response to questions from the press about the cooling systems, stated that the emergency water circulation equipment and reactor core isolation time cooling systems would work even without electricity.  The emergency water circulation system (IC) did in fact start working before the power loss and continue working after the power was lost as well.

Sometime between 4 and 6 am, on May 12, Yoshida Masao, the plant manager decided it was time to pump seawater into the reactor core and notified TEPCO. Seawater was not pumped in until hours after a hydrogen explosion occurred, roughly 8:00 pm that day. By then, it was probably already too late.

On May 15, TEPCO went some way toward admitting at least some of these claims in a report called “Reactor Core Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit One.”  The report said there was pre-tsunami damage to key facilities including pipes.  “This means that assurances from the industry in Japan and overseas that the reactors were robust is now blown apart,” said Shaun Burnie, an independent nuclear waste consultant. “It raises fundamental questions on all reactors in high seismic risk areas.”

As Burnie points out, TEPCO also admitted massive fuel melt –16 hours after loss of coolant, and 7-8 hours before the explosion in unit 1.  “Since they must have known all this — their decision to flood with massive water volumes would guarantee massive additional contamination – including leaks to the ocean.”

No one knows exactly how much damage was done to the plant by the quake, or if this damage alone would account for the meltdown. However, eyewitness testimony and TEPCO’S own data indicates that the damage was significant. All of this despite the fact that shaking experienced at the plant during the quake was within it’s approved design specifications. Says Hasuike:

“What really happened at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant to cause a meltdown? TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) and the government of Japan have provided many explanations. They don’t make sense. The one thing they haven’t provided is the truth. It’s time that they did.”

David McNeill writes for The Independent, The Irish Times and The Chronicle of Higher Education. He is an Asia-Pacific Journal coordinator.

Jake Adelstein worked primarily as a police reporter for The Yomiuri newspaper from April 1993 to November 2005; he was the first foreigner to write in Japanese for a national newspaper. He now runs the websitewww.japansubculture.com, writes for Japanese periodicals and The Atlantic Wire, and does risk management consulting for foreign firms in Japan. He is the author of Tokyo Vice: An American Reporter on the Police Beat in Japan.

This article appears in  The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 32 No 2, August 8, 2011.

「再稼動」より「廃炉事業」で地元が潤う

上岡直見

　すでに筆者が試算（＊１）したように、原発のある自治体と、ない自治体で、「課税義務者課税対象所得」「失業率」「住民１人あたり民生費（福祉関係費歳出）」を統計的に比較したところ、有意な差がない。おおい町長は再稼動歓迎を表明したというが、筆者の同記事で示したように、大飯原発の運転開始以後は、地元自治体の商業販売額も低下傾向である。これは、原発の主要な地域経済効果は建設段階の、いわゆる「工事」で発生するためである。つまり、再稼動しても地域経済に大した効果がないことはわかっている。

　もし原発建設段階のような「工事」が欲しいなら、いい考えがある。それは「廃炉事業」を始めることである。原子炉が停止していても、使いかけの燃料棒が発電所内に貯留されていると、福島第一原発の４号炉と同様に依然としてリスクは軽減されない。これを安全に撤去し廃炉処理を実施しなければならない。

　日本で、商業炉の解体撤去事業は実際に行われたことがないので、正確な費用は筆者もわからない。しかしこれまでいくつかの情報で推定されている数字を参照すると、少なく見積もっても「１炉あたり」次のような費用が想定されている。

解体費用　３００億円
解体に伴って生じる廃棄物の処分　４００億円
施設撤去までの維持費　４００億円
運転中に出た低レベル放射性廃棄物の処分　１４０億円
合計　１，２４０億円

　これを県内１５基（商用路・実験炉）で今後１０年間に均等に需要が発生するものとして、産業部門別に推定・整理し、産業連関分析により効果を推定する。その結果、約１，５００億円の付加価値と約１３，０００人の雇用をもたらすと推定される。付加価値の誘発量では再稼動を下回ると思われるが、雇用誘発量では再稼動より大きい。もちろん、処理をていねいにするほど雇用は増える。これらに前述の記事で試算したように、県内各産業の自給率向上を組み合わせれば、再稼動よりも福井県の経済にプラスをもたらす。原発を止めていると地域外からの定期検査関係者が来なくなって、地元の旅館業の人が困っているなどと報道された。それだったら「廃炉工事」を始めたほうがはるかに多くの関係者が、しかも年間を通じて集まるだろう。

（＊１）福井の「地産地消」で脱原発 http://www.janjanblog.com/archives/68245